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within the criminal justice population and provide defendant perspective.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The study of decision-making is commonly found in various areas of criminal justice research
and has included the study of jurors, judges, and prosecutors (e.g., Burke, 2007; Finkelstein, 1975;
Ma, 2002). Decision-making research is utilized in many fields to understand factors that lead to
individuals making one choice over another, which leads to many different research opportunities in
the realm of criminal justice (e.g., Burke, 2007; Ma, 2002). Understanding how and why different
individuals in the criminal justice system make various decisions can benefit others, such as a
prosecutor being able to understand juror decision-making when preparing their case. As such, the
study of decision-making in the criminal justice system can benefit not just researchers, but those who
work in it, such as prosecutors and judges, and others affected by it, such as inmates.
Choice Research in Criminal Justice
Choice research performed in the criminal justice system is commonly performed on jurors,
judges, and prosecutors. There are many aspects of jury and juror decision-making that interests
researchers in this field. Some studies in this area have been performed on the effects of expert or
eyewitness testimony in trial on juror decision-making where jurors were found to be more sensitive
to eyewitness testimony when coupled with expert testimony (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989).
Another found that mock jurors were more likely to vote guilty in the presence of an accomplice
witness testimony (Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, & Neuschatz, 2008). Further, the effect
of judge-jury interaction on jury decision-making has been studied with findings indicating that jurors
and judges evaluate evidence differently or apply different standards of proof (e.g., MacCoun, 1990;
Frankel, 1990). Further, there exist many more studies that aim to seek out additional factors that
influence jury decision-making such as juror perception of the defendant (e.g., defendant’s mental
state) or presentation of disposition instructions on decision (Whittemore & Ogloff, 1995),
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presentation of judicial instructions (prohibitive versus informative instructions) on decisions (Shaw
& Skolnick, 1995), and even the effect of attorney gender on juror decisions (Nelson, 2004) to name a
few. Overall, a wide variety of decision-making research related to jurors and juries appears to exist,
but similar research on defendants and offenders appears to be lacking in comparison.
In addition to studying jurors, many studies exist examining judges’ decision-making.
Judicial decision-making based on the judge’s gender or race has been the focus of several studies.
One such example was Peresie (2004) which cites past empirical findings with conflicting results,
with some prior studies finding a direct effect of gender on judging, and some finding no such effect.
Many studies appear to exist on judicial decision-making in specified case types such as in divorce
cases where rulings are influenced by current social and public opinion trends (Garrison, 1995). A
similar study focused on child custody disputes found that counselor recommendations and child
preference were the only influencing factors on a judge’s final decision (Kunin, Ebbesen, & Konecni,
1992). Additionally, when the death penalty is involved in a court decision, elected judges are more
likely to uphold the jury’s decision for the death sentence when their elections approach (Bowers,
Foglia, Giles, & Antonio, 2006). More recent research has even sought to mimic judges’ decisionmaking within artificial intelligence to reshape or supplement the judicial role (Sourdin, 2018).
Decision-making amongst prosecutors is also a well-researched topic. Much of this research
is focused on factors related to prosecutorial preferences (e.g., Rainville, 2001) and decision-making
in case processing (e.g., Albonetti, 1986; Cole, 1969; Rebovich, 1996) or in the charging function
(Gershman, 2010). Further, there exists research examining the effect of different roles in the criminal
justice on each other, such as the influence of sentencing demands from a prosecutor on judicial
decision-making (e.g., Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; White, 1987). There are also several
studies focused on the influence of prosecutors on juror decision-making as well (e.g., Greene &
Dodge, 1995; White, 1987).
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Plea Bargaining
Thus, while there is substantial research in criminal justice on the decision-making of various
individuals involved in the system, little is known from the defendants’ perspectives. One particular
area of the criminal justice system where defendant decision-making research is lacking is in the pleabargaining process. Plea bargaining is a common form of criminal case resolution in the criminal
justice system, and while controversial, it is more cost efficient than sending all criminal cases to trial
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). In a plea-bargaining scenario, before going to trial a defendant
facing a criminal charge will be presented with an opportunity by the prosecuting attorney to plead
guilty to a lesser charge or to the original charge with a lesser sentence by prosecutors (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2011). The plea bargain process leaves the defendant with the choice between
a guaranteed plea bargain or continuing their case to trial where they face the maximum charge and/or
sentence if found guilty (U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). Going to trial is often perceived as risky
as it is nearly impossible to predict what a jury or judge will decide, and thus, roughly 95% of
criminal cases are resolved by accepting a plea bargain and never make it to trial (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2011; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, 2009; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005). Put simply,
defendants are often faced with deciding between a smaller, guaranteed sentence or risking being
found guilty in trial and receiving a larger sentence.
Research on the plea bargain system has led to much controversy surrounding the practice.
One of the biggest criticisms of the plea-bargaining process is that it allows prosecutors too much
discretion in comparison to judges, as judges are held to explicit sentencing guidelines that do not
apply to prosecutors in this scenario (Burke, 2007; U.S. Department of Justice, 2011; Finkelstein,
1975). Finkelstein (1975) discovered that prosecutors have been found to use threats, such as more
serious charges or longer sentencing, to coerce defendants into accepting pleas to secure a conviction
when case evidence is insubstantial and may not be viewed as likely to lead to conviction in trial.
Further, other researchers have noted the influences of prosecutorial biases on the plea-bargaining
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process due to the wide latitude prosecutors are given when they reduce charges for defendants (Ma,
2002; Burke, 2007).
Despite roughly 95% of criminal cases being resolved in plea bargaining, Bar-Gill and BenShahar (2009) argue that many defendants who settle for a plea bargain would not have been charged
or faced such harsh sentencing had they gone to trial. They also suggest that we cannot count on the
fact that plea bargains are entered voluntarily and are desirable for all parties involved (Bar-Gill &
Ben-Shahar, 2009). This paper cites several other studies that point to the coercive nature of plea
bargains and that the defendant’s choice of a plea bargain is often a response to threats and powerful
constraints from prosecutors, thus making defendants fear the possibility of trial (Alschuler, 1981;
Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, 2009; Schulhofer, 1992). These threats from prosecutors are referred to as the
defendants’ collective action problem and it is suggested that if defendants were able to bargain
collectively, harsh plea bargains would not be so readily accepted (Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, 2009).
This information further reflects the need to understand the decision-making process in pleabargaining from the defendant perspective.
Overall, defendant decision-making appears to be the least researched of all the various roles
in the criminal justice system. The analysis of how defendants make decisions, such as plea bargains,
can greatly benefit many who work within the criminal justice system, whether it be prosecutors,
defense attorneys, or judges. With many studies pointing to flaws in the system via prosecutorial bias
and discretion (e.g., Albonetti, 1991; Britt, 2000; Burke, 2007; Ma, 2002; Finkelstein, 1975), there is
intellectual merit in having a study that focuses on the defendant perspective in the plea-bargaining
process. Thus, this research could benefit the criminal justice system by providing information that
could aid in developing new policy and guidelines to ensuring a more just and fair systematic process.
Probability Discounting
Decision-making in the plea-bargaining process can be understood through a variety of tools
used in choice and decision-making research, such as behavioral economics. One tool used in

11
behavioral economics that can be used is probability discounting. Probability discounting is a
behavioral economics tool used to quantify an individual’s decision making by measuring how the
negative value of some event (e.g., prison time) becomes less potent as it becomes less likely to occur
(e.g., likelihood of conviction at trial; Falligant & Pence, 2019; McKerchar & Renda, 2012; Myerson,
Green, & Morris, 2011; Odum, 2011; Shead & Hodgins, 2009). As the outcome becomes less potent,
a person’s choice is less likely to be affected by that outcome. The decision-making process in a
probability discounting paradigm is measured by presenting participants with the choice between two
outcomes. With one outcome, there is a guaranteed outcome that the person will receive. With a
second outcome, there is a greater outcome with a varying probability or likelihood of receipt
(McKerchar & Renda, 2012; Myerson, Green, & Morris, 2011). Thus, participants are making
choices between a guaranteed choice or a risky choice. As seen in existing discounting research,
individuals often prefer the immediate or guaranteed choice over the delayed or probabilistic choice
(Myerson et al., 2011). In other words, individuals often prefer the smaller certain choice over the
larger probabilistic choice, because the value of the probabilistic choice is discounted, whereas the
value of the immediate choice is not (Myerson et al., 2011).
Probability discounting has been used to examine a variety of research questions. Most
commonly, measures of probability discounting are used to measure impulsive decision-making. One
such example includes a study performed by Reynolds and colleagues (2004) where smokers were
found to demonstrate greater impulsivity, or greater rates of discounting, than nonsmokers on a
monetary amount task. A similar task allowed for Richards and colleagues (2013) to determine that
alcohol use did not influence participants’ discounting by comparing their rates of discounting when
sober and when under the influence of alcohol. Broader studies using this method have also included
presenting participants with decision-making tasks with a variety of gains and losses to determine the
perceived value of the outcome (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006).
Due to the very nature of plea bargains, a probability discounting task can be easily adapted
into a plea bargain scenario. A plea bargain decision can be conceptualized as a choice between the
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acceptance of a plea bargain of a lesser, guaranteed punishment or going to trial where there is an
unknown likelihood of being convicted and receiving a larger punishment (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2011). Therefore, this scenario can be presented to participants as a choice between a
specified amount of prison time from a plea bargain versus the choice of going to trial with a varying
likelihood of being convicted of a specified maximum sentence.
A recent study sought to examine plea bargain decision-making by using both delay and
probability discounting tasks to measure hypothetical plea bargain decision-making in various
situations (prison versus sex offender registry) on an undergraduate student sample (Falligant &
Pence, 2019). That study primarily sought to use both delay and probability discounting tasks to
understand decisions in a criminal justice context. Delay discounting is another form of discounting
used as a behavioral economics tool (Odum, 2011). In the study (Falligant & Pence, 2019), the
authors analyze the difference in participants’ rates of discounting when facing prison time versus
having to be on the sex offender registry. The authors used a fill-in-the-blank task to measure
discounting, in which participants were told to imagine a scenario where they were being charged
with a crime and faced a varying probability of being convicted in trial and having to serve a varying
prison sentence or varying time of being a registered sex offender (Falligant & Pence, 2019). They
were then asked to type in the number of years in a plea bargain that they would accept instead
(Falligant & Pence, 2019). Overall, the study found that participants did not discount differently when
facing larger potential sentences (e.g., 1 year versus 25 years in prison). Additionally, rates of
discounting between the two consequence types (prison time versus sex offender registry) were found
to be similar (Falligant & Pence, 2019). These results indicated that participants’ preferences for
probabilistic outcomes framed as losses were largely unaffected by both consequence type and
magnitude.
As probability discounting is a tool used in a variety of research areas, there are numerous
methods of measuring probability discounting. Common measures include multiple choice methods,
adjusting amount tasks, and fill-in-the-blank tasks (Chapman, 1996; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004;
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Beck & Triplett, 2009). The multiple-choice (MC) method (Beck & Triplett, 2009) allows the
participant to select a subjective value from a list of choices provided by the researcher (e.g., Which
one of the following amounts would you be willing to accept today rather than have a 50% chance of
receiving $100?). The adjusting amount task instead presents adaptive choices to the participant based
on their previously made selections (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004). For example, if a participant
was presented with the choice to receive $10 or a 50% chance of receiving $100 and chose the
guaranteed $10, the adjusting amount task would adjust the $10 to a lower number. If the participant
chose the probable outcome, the guaranteed amount would adjust to a higher number. Lastly, the fillin-the-blank task (Chapman, 1996) asks participants to generate the subjective value of an outcome
without presenting options (e.g., How much money would you accept today rather than have a 50% of
receiving $100?).
Research surrounding the reliability of one task over another has been conducted several
times (e.g., Weatherly & Derenne, 2011; 2013). Data has demonstrated that the fill-in-the-blank
method produces steeper rates of discounting than other methods (Weatherly & Derenne, 2011; 2013;
Terrell, Derenne, & Weatherly, 2014). Further, the study performed by Weatherly and Derenne
(2011) demonstrated that the fill-in-the-blank demonstrated poor reliability relative to other measures.
In comparison, a study that utilized the adjusting amount task (Friedel, DeHart, Madden, & Odum,
2014) produced higher R2 values, indicating that discounting models fit adjusting amount data better
than fill-in-the-blank data. Overall, the adjusting amount test is more commonly used in discounting
research.
How This Study is Original
Small and Friedel (in preparation) recently conducted a study with a sample of undergraduate
students where they replicated Falligant and Pence’s (2019) fill-in-the-blank task. This study also
conducted an adjusting amount task to make comparisons between the data of both tasks. The study
found that data from the adjusting amount task was best fit by the Mazur (1987) nonlinear curve-
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fitting model, but no model fit well to the data from the fill-in-the-blank task. This was supported by
lower root-mean-square deviation (RMSE), or standard deviation of residuals, values which measure
how far from the regression line data points are. This demonstrated not only that the adjusting amount
task produces data with higher quality models, but that discounting could in fact be used as a measure
for plea bargain decision-making through use of the adjusting amount task.
While the study performed by Falligant and Pence (2019) serves as an integral starting point
for the use of discounting to measure plea bargain decision-making, its use of a student sample is a
limitation in terms of generalizing results. Behavioral scientists often utilize student samples in their
research and then publish broad claims regarding human behavior and psychology, but these samples
may not actually be so generalizable (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). American student
samples have been described as “WEIRD,” as they come from Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies, thus making results that come from them unable to be
generalized to the world, or potentially even generalizable to the United States (Henrich et al., 2010).
Despite these limitations, American undergraduates form the bulk of data in psychology’s
experimental fields of psychology, cognitive sciences, and other related fields (Henrich et al., 2010).
It is probable that the use of undergraduate samples in criminal justice research may be even less
fitting.
Further, undergraduates are likely inappropriate to use in research such as plea bargain
decision-making due to an inherent position of potential privilege they are in (e.g., higher education)
compared to offenders currently in the criminal justice system. In addition, people that do not work or
have direct involvement in the criminal justice system (including students) may simply lack
knowledge about these processes due to unfamiliarity with the system. The Bureau of Justice
Statistics (2003) notes that about 41% of federal inmates and 31% of probationers have not completed
high school or its equivalency, compared to just 18% of the general adult population. Further, passing
the GED testing process was the highest level of education attained by roughly 25% of state prison
inmates, 20% of Federal inmates, and 10% of probationers, compared to about 4% of the general
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population (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003). Furthermore, it may not be appropriate to assume that
undergraduate students have a complete understanding of the criminal justice system. That
incomplete understanding might apply especially to the plea-bargaining process, nor might they have
a full grasp on the fact that many offenders are pushed to accepting plea bargains for a variety of
reasons (e.g., Albonetti, 1991; Britt, 2000; Burke, 2007; Finkelstein, 1975; Ma, 2002).
Research Questions
This study sought to build on Falligant and Pence’s (2019) prior work by extending the
sample beyond undergraduate students and using a sample of adults with experience with the criminal
justice system. By using adults with experience in the system, this study provides greater
generalizability to criminal justice populations in comparison to students. Additionally, this study
allowed for other factors, such as race and socioeconomic status, to be explored. Furthermore, this
study utilized an adjusting amount task to administer the probability discounting tasks rather than the
fill-in-the-blank task used by Falligant and Pence (2019). As described above, adjusting amount tasks
are a more common measure of probability discounting than the fill-in-the-blank task and allow for
greater accuracy and reliability in this study (e.g., Friedel et al., 2014; Weatherly et al., 2011). In
addition to the adjusting amount task being more common and reliable, the null results in Falligant
and Pence’s (2019) probability discounting task may have been a result of their use of the fill-in-theblank task.
The first research question of this study was: Do people with experience in the criminal
justice system discount plea bargain decision-making differently when faced with different lengths of
maximum prison sentences? The second research question of the study was: Is the degree of
discounting correlated across prison sentences?
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
Participants
To determine an appropriate sample size, a power analysis was conducted. The analysis was
conducted with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) using the reported effect size (𝜂𝑝2
= 0.72) from Falligant and Pence (2019). For the analysis, repeated measures, within factors ANOVA
was specified and an estimated non-sphericity correction of .88 was used. Due to Falligant and Pence
(2019) not reporting a correlation statistic, a conservative estimate of r = 0.3 was used. Finally, alpha
was set at 0.05 and power of 0.95. The power analysis determined that a sample size of 4 was needed
for the study. Study participants were recruited through Qualtrics and followed specified exclusionary
criteria.
Exclusionary Criteria
The study had three criteria that participants had to meet to be included in the study.
Following the informed consent, participants were asked to respond to 5 questions assessing their
personal experience in the criminal justice system. Response options were yes, no, or not sure. The
questions asked the participants if they themselves 1) have ever been arrested, 2) have ever been to
jail or prison, or 3) have ever been convicted of a crime. Questions also asked participants if a friend
or family member of theirs 1) has ever been arrested, 2) has ever been to jail or prison, or 3) has ever
been convicted of a crime. Participants had to respond “yes” to at least one of the six questions to be
included.
The second criterion was that participants had to be 18 years of age or older. Participants
were asked to input their age in years as part of the demographic questions section following the
informed consent and criminal justice experience questions. Any participants who inputted an age
younger than 18, or left the question blank, were excluded.
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Lastly, the third criterion was that participants who failed an attention check were excluded.
There were 6 total attention check questions; one appeared in the beginning of the survey following
the demographic questions section, and the remaining 5 appeared at the end of the survey following
the adjusting amount tasks. This was done to assess attention both before and after the adjusting
amount tasks. All attention check questions gave participants the choice to respond “yes” or “no.”
The attention check at the beginning was: “Have you ever completed a JMSS
measure/questionnaire?” The JMSS measure is fictitious and does not exist. The set of 5 attention
checks at the end of the survey asked participants if 1) they had ever been to Canada, 2) had ever been
bitten by an insect, 3) are human, 4) have ever suffered a fatal heart attack, and 5) have ever been
bitten by a great white shark. This set of attention check questions were designed so that participants
could not reply only yes or only no to all 5 questions. Thus, any participants who did respond yes to
all 5 questions or responded no to all 5 questions was excluded.
Procedures
In this study, we analyzed plea bargain decision-making using a probability discounting task
via an online survey of a sample of adults with experience in the criminal justice system. Survey
participants were recruited through Qualtrics recruitment service, who ensured that participants met
inclusionary criteria described below. Participants were reimbursed for their time at a value of the
federal minimum wage for 30 minutes of their time if they met inclusion criteria and completed the
survey in its entirety. All survey materials were presented to participants using Qualtrics. The online
survey first presented the participant with an informed consent, and if they selected the option
indicating giving their consent to the study, they were taken to the first section of the survey which
contained demographics questions. These questions asked participants about their age, sex assigned at
birth, gender identity, sexual orientation, education level, income level, and zip code. This section
also asked participants if they themselves or someone they know has previously been arrested,
charged, or convicted of a crime, and ever spent time in jail or prison. Participants that answered “no”
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to all criminal justice experience questions were immediately excluded from the study and did not
continue forward to the remainder of the survey.
Following the demographics section, participants were then taken to a screen with the first
adjusting amount task. There were three total tasks, one for each of the three magnitudes [1, 5, 25
year(s)], with an instruction block appearing first to explain the hypothetical situation to the
participants. The instruction block told participants to imagine that they have been accused of a crime
and if they go to trial, their lawyer has given them a certain likelihood of being convicted, and they
can choose to accept a plea bargain of a reduced sentence instead of prison. This block further
clarified that the plea bargain is always a guaranteed prison sentence, with only the likelihood of a
prison sentence after a trial. After the participant selected the “next” button on the instruction page,
they were brought to the adjusting amount task. After completion of the three adjusting amount tasks,
participants were brought to the last part of the survey which contained 7 attention check questions.
The Adjusting Amount Task
The adjusting-amount task is an algorithm-based task that adjusts the questions a participant
sees based on the participant’s prior choices and produces the main measure of probability
discounting. First, participants were told to imagine that they are faced with a choice between
accepting a guaranteed duration of incarceration or a jury trial with some probability of being
convicted of a longer duration of incarceration. For the first trial, the task presented a choice (e.g.,
select the option you would prefer: a plea bargain of serving 12.5 years in prison or a 99% chance of
being convicted and serving 25 years in prison). The participant then selected the option they prefer.
As this task is algorithm-based, the choice made by the participant on trial 1 affected the choices
presented to them on trial 2. Thus, on subsequent trials, the algorithm adjusted the plea bargain
duration based on the participant’s past choices to find the maximum acceptable plea bargain for each
combination of incarceration lengths and likelihoods of conviction. For example, if the participant
selected the 12.5 years plea bargain, the next trial presented a larger, less desirable plea bargain (e.g.,
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18.25 years). If they chose the 99% chance of 25 years in prison, the next trial presented a shorter,
more desirable plea bargain (e.g., 6.25 years).
The adjustment became smaller with each trial to narrow down the maximum accepted plea
bargain (e.g., adjusting from 12.5 to 6.25, then 6.25 to 3.13, etc.). This adjustment happened for a
total of 7 trials (6 adjustments) for each magnitude and likelihood of conviction combination and was
performed 5 different times (7 trials for each likelihood of conviction for each magnitude) for each
magnitude. The final plea bargain amount at the end of the 7 trials is the indifference point for the
specified magnitude and probability. There were three different durations of incarceration associated
with the trial choice alternative: 1, 5, and 25 year(s). Additionally, there were five different
likelihoods of conviction via trial: 99%, 90%, 50%, 10%, and 1%.
Overall, the purpose of this task was to gather the aforementioned indifference points from
each participant. The indifference points served as the dependent variable of this study, and
discounting studies in general (Odum, 2011). In the case of this study, the indifference points are the
plea bargain incarceration durations that are subjectively equivalent to the probabilistic incarceration
durations. For example, an indifference point of “20” on the task with the 25-year magnitude and a
99% probability of being convicted would indicate that the participant views accepting a plea bargain
of 20 years as equal to the maximum sentence (e.g., 25 years) with those odds of conviction (e.g.,
99% chance of conviction). Thus, this measure assessed the participant’s degree of discounting
probabilistic incarceration (Odum, 2011).
Data Analysis
Before analyses were conducted, datum was filtered using criteria discussed by Johnson and
Bickel (2008) to identify nonsystematic indifference points. These criteria were used to filter data to
eliminate potentially low-quality data ensure given the limited use of tasks of this nature on this
population. The Johnson and Bickel (2008) criteria examines individual data points to identify
indifference points that were not monotonically decreasing with probability. In other words, this
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approach flags participant data that does not appear to follow a trajectory in decision-making that
discounting models, such as the Mazur model (1987), state. Thus, the current study flagged instances
of non-systematic discounting data using the two criteria of Johnson and Bickel (2008): 1) if any
indifference point (starting with the second probability) was greater than the preceding indifference
point by a magnitude greater than 20% of the larger later sentence and 2) if the last indifference point
(obtained at probability of conviction) was not less than the first indifference point by at least a
magnitude equal to 10% of the larger later outcome (Johnson & Bickel, 2008). The first criterion
flags participant data where at least one indifference point (starting with the second probability) is
greater than the preceding indifference point by a magnitude 20% of the larger, potential conviction
(Johnson & Bickel, 2008). Violation of criterion 1 in this study would indicate that larger plea
bargains become more desirable as likelihood of conviction decreases, rather than becoming less
desirable. The second criterion flags data to ensure that the last indifference point (e.g., 99%) is not
less than the first indifference (e.g., 1%) by a magnitude of at least 10% of the maximum prison
sentence (Johnson & Bickel, 2008). Violation of criterion 2 in the data indicate that probability of
conviction has minimal or no impact on willingness to accept a plea bargain (Johnson and Bickel,
2008). The indifference points were assessed with both criteria for each of the three tasks (one task
for each magnitude) so that participants were excluded for violating one or both criterion on at least
one task. Use of these criterion flagged 57 participants and reduced the sample from 101 participants
to 44 participants.
First, to equate the degree of discounting across prison sentence duration (e.g., magnitude)
the indifference points were standardized. The indifference points were divided by the maximum
potential sentence to represent a proportion of the maximum amount presented in the questions [1, 5,
25 year(s)]. For example, all the indifference points for the task with a maximum potential sentence
of 25 years were divided by 25. Thus, all indifference points were transformed into proportions of the
long duration sentence. Then, the Mazur (1987) discounting model was fit to the standardized
indifference points. The Mazur (1987) model was used instead of others (e.g., Rachlin, 2006;
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Myerson & Green, 1995) because a previous study conducted (Small and Friedel, in preparation) with
a student sample found the Mazur (1987) model to be the highest quality model based on AICc
values. That Mazur model is
𝑉=

𝐴
1 + 𝑏𝜃

in which the parameter V is the indifference point, θ is the odds against being convicted, A is the
magnitude of standardized prison time (all set to the standardized value of 1), and b is the degree of
discounting. The model was fitted to group-level median indifference points.
The first goal of the study was to determine if there were differences in the degree of
discounting across prison sentence durations. To answer this first question, a repeated measures
ANOVA approach was used. Area under the curve (AUC) values were used for these analyses as they
are a commonly used measure of discounting due to being theoretically neutral and typically
circumvent statistical problems created by skewed distributions resulting from curve fitting (Myerson,
Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). The AUC values represent the area between the indifference
points and the x-axis if those data points were plotted on a graph. Area-under-the-curve was
calculated by using a formula to calculate the area of adjacent trapezoids (as if they were plotted on a
graph). The formula for the trapezoids is (Y1+Y2)/2 * (X2 – X1) where Y are successive indifference
points and X are successive odds against conviction. The trapezoids are summed to obtain the final
AUC (Myerson et al., 2001). For the repeated-measures ANOVA, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was used to account for sphericity.
The second goal of the study was to determine if the degree of discounting is correlated
across prison sentence durations. To answer this question, a Pearson’s correlation analysis was used.
Correlation analyses were conducted to compare discounting at 25 years to 5 years, 25 years to 1
year, and 5 years to 1 year.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Sample Demographics
The sample consisted of 42 participants. The sample had a median age of 43 years old.
Most of the sample reported both their sex assigned at birth and gender identity as female (see Table
1). The majority of the sample identified as heterosexual. Further, much of the sample identified as
white and not Hispanic or Latino/Latina/Latinx. Reported household income had some variability,
with about a quarter of the sample having reported an annual household income of less than $10,000.
While the demographic section of the survey did contain a question requesting that the participant
input their zip code, most participants left this question blank.
Table 1: Demographics
Demographic
Sex assigned at birth
Female
Male
Gender Identity
Female
Male
Sexual Orientation
Heterosexual
Bisexual
Homosexual
Asexual
Pansexual
Prefer not to say
Racial Identity
White/Caucasian
Black/African American
Native American or Native Alaskan
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
Ethnic Identity

Participants (N = 42)
61.9% (n = 26)
38.1% (n = 16)
61.9% (n = 26)
38.1% (n = 16)
81% (n = 34)
16.7% (n = 7)
2.4% (n = 1)
81% (n = 34)
11.9% (n = 5)
2.4% (n = 1)
4.8% (n = 2)
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Not Hispanic and/or Latino/Latina/Latinx
Hispanic and/or Latino/Latino/Latinx
Prefer not to answer
Reported Household Income Range
Less than $10,000
$10,000-$19,999
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$39,999
$40,000-$49,999
$50,000-$59,999
$60,000-$69,999
$70,000-$79,999
$80,000-$89,999
$90,000-$99,999
$100,000-$149,999
More than $150,000

83.3% (n = 35)
9.5% (n = 4)
7.1% (n = 3)
7.1% (n = 3)
11.9% (n = 5)
16.7% (n = 7)
14.3% (n = 6)
14.3% (n = 6)
7.1% (n = 3)
2.4% (n = 1)
9.5% (n = 4)
4.8% (n = 2)
2.4% (n = 1)
7.1% (n = 3)
2.4% (n = 1)

About half of the sample reported having been arrested (see Table 2). Next, a little under
half reported having ever been to jail or prison, and a little under half reported ever being convicted of
a crime. Almost all the participants reported having a friend or family member who had been arrested.
Further, most of the sample had a friend or family member who had been to jail or prison and
convicted of a crime.
Table 2: Reported Criminal Justice Experience
Criminal Justice Experience
Have you ever been arrested?
Yes
No
Not sure
Have you ever been to jail or prison?
Yes
No
Not sure
Have you ever been convicted of a crime?
Yes
No
Not sure
Has a friend or family member of yours ever
been arrested?

Participants (N = 42)
45.2% (n = 19)
54.8% (n = 23)
35.7% (n = 15)
64.3% (n = 27)
40.5% (n = 17)
59.5% (n = 25)
-
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Yes
No
Not sure
Has a friend or family member of yours ever
been to jail or prison?
Yes
No
Not sure
Has a friend or family member of yours ever
been convicted of a crime?
Yes
No
Not sure

90.5% (n = 38)
4.8% (n = 2)
4.8% (n = 2)

90.5% (n = 38)
7.1% (n = 3)
2.4% (n = 1)

73.8% (n = 31)
19% (n = 8)
7.1% (n = 3)

Analyses Results
Figure 1 displays the Mazur model curves for each of the three magnitudes used. This figure
demonstrates participants’ willingness to accept a plea bargain decreasing as the odds that they will
not be convicted increases. Table 3 displays parameter estimates, including the R2 and RMSE values.
The R2 and RMSE values produced by the Mazur model formula indicate a good fit to the group-level
data. The table also displays the best-fit b values which are similar across the three magnitudes,
indicating that choices made at each magnitude were not more or less impulsive compared to each
other.
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Figure 1 Mazur Model Curves

Table 3 Mazur Model Fit Statistics
Magnitude

Best-fit b value

𝑅2

RMSE

1 year

0.03955

0.8643

0.1477

5 years

0.03961

0.8253

0.1537

25 years

0.04026

0.8113

0.1546

Figure 2 displays a box-and-whisker plot (Tukey whiskers) based on the distribution of
individual-level AUC values for each magnitude. The “whiskers,” or lines extending from the boxes,
represent the outlier AUC values for each magnitude. The boxes themselves represent interquartile
range, where most of the AUC values fall and the lines within the boxes denote the median AUC
value. The repeated-measures one-way ANOVA of the area under the curve (AUC) values indicate no
statistically significant differences in AUC values across the three magnitudes [F (1.886, 77.33) =
1.57, p = 0.2157]. In terms of discounting, this means that participants did not differ in how they
discounted a plea bargain when facing different maximum potential prison sentences.
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Figure 2 Box-and-Whisker Plot

Figure 3 displays the scatterplots demonstrating the correlations across the three
magnitudes. Pearson’s correlations were calculated to compare degree of discounting between the
different magnitudes of prison sentences. Table 4 contains the Pearson’s r between AUC at each
pairing of magnitudes. Pearson’s correlation analyses across all three magnitudes all produced
statistically significant r values, which can be visualized by the scatterplots’ demonstrations of strong,
positive correlations. In other words, as the choice to forgo a plea bargain in exchange for the choice
to go to trial increases at one magnitude, it also increases at other magnitudes.
Figure 3 Pearson Correlation Scatterplots
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Table 4 Pearson Correlation Results
1 year

5 years

25 years

1 year

1

0.78***

0.73***

5 years

-

1

0.83***

25 years

-

-

1

*** represents p <0.001
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study utilized a probability discounting task to measure decision-making in hypothetical
plea bargain scenarios when faced with varying lengths of maximum prison sentences. This sample of
individuals with direct or indirect criminal justice experience responded to scenarios with varying
probabilities of being convicted of a crime via a jury trial and having to serve a stated maximum
potential prison sentence (e.g., prison time). The Mazur model formula produced model parameters
determining good fit with group-level data, indicating that participants discounted according to the
Mazur model by displaying steeper discounting as odds of not being convicted increased. The
repeated-measures ANOVA used to test the first research question found that different maximum
prison sentence lengths, or sentences of different severities, did not affect participants’ decisionmaking. This indicates that while severity or length of maximum sentence did not affect participants’
willingness to accept a plea bargain, their decision was impacted by the likelihood of being convicted
at trial. Thus, certainty affected participants’ willingness to accept a plea bargain in that they were
less likely to accept a plea bargain as the likelihood of conviction decreased.
The second research question sought to determine if participants’ discounting when faced
with different probabilities were similar at the different magnitudes. Even though participants’
willingness to accept a plea bargain did not differ when facing different sentence lengths, correlation
analyses demonstrated that participants’ rate of discounting was consistent across magnitudes. In
other words, if an individual demonstrated steep discounting when facing a maximum sentence of 1
year, then they were going to demonstrate steep discounting when facing a maximum sentence of 25
years. Thus, while decision-making did not differ significantly between magnitudes, decision-making
followed a similar pattern at the various probabilities of conviction across magnitudes.
This study’s findings are similar to those published by Schneider and Zottoli (2019)
wherein participants assigned to guilty and innocent conditions were offered discounted sentences
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(20%, 50%, or 70%) in exchange for a guilty plea in place of a potential trial sentence of 5 or 25
years. However, in the current study, potential trial sentence had a minimal effect on plea acceptance,
despite previous research supporting the notion that plea acceptance increases with increasing
potential trial sentences (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Zimmerman & Hunter, 2018). Specifically,
discount played a larger role in participant willingness to accept a plea than potential trial sentence
magnitude (Schneider & Zottoli, 2019). These differences could be due to the fact that the current
study presented participants with choices where much of the focus was placed on the probability of
being convicted at trial, whereas the study by Schneider and Zottoli (2019) simply focused on
discounting the value of the actual plea bargain, regardless of the probability of being convicted.
Simply put, the current study’s independent variable was the probability of being convicted at trial
and the independent variable in the study by Schneider and Zottoli (2019) was the value of the plea
bargain itself.
The current study’s findings that participants’ willingness to accept a plea bargain was
unaffected by severity of potential sentence but was affected by probability of conviction is also
consistent with literature on deterrence theory. Mendes and McDonald (2001) performed a metaanalysis on 33 published studies regarding the effect of severity on deterrence. That meta-analysis
cites research dating to the 1970s wherein researchers consistently find null findings regarding
severity of punishment (e.g., length of sentence) influencing deterrence (Mendes & McDonald, 2001).
Rather, it is certainty (e.g., the likelihood that punishment will actually occur) and celerity (e.g., the
time between the occurrence of the crime and receiving punishment) of punishment that often affects
defendants. The concept that certainty and celerity play a larger role in deterrence than severity has
come to be generally accepted in the field (Tonry, 2017; O’Connell et al., 2011; Pogarsky, 2009).
This is also evident in practice by harsher punishments failing to deter violent and drug crimes any
more than lesser ones do, the fact that mandatory minimum sentences and lengthy prison terms in
practice have failed to deter crime, and the death penalty’s inability to deter homicide compared to
other available punishments (Tonry, 2017).
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Thus, while the current study found that magnitude (e.g., severity of maximum potential
punishment) had no significant effect on participant decision-making, this study did establish support
for certainty of punishment playing a role. Evidence that certainty impacted participants’ decisionmaking was seen in the Mazur curve-fitting models for the three magnitudes used in this study that
showed a decline in willingness to accept a plea bargain when the probability of conviction
decreased. In other words, as the occurrence of punishment became less certain, participants were less
willing to accept a plea bargain.
Limitations and Future Directions
A limitation of the study was sample size and demographic make-up of the sample. The
sample consisted mostly of heterosexual, cisgender, white, non-Hispanic/Latinx individuals. This is
not reflective of the diverse demographic make-up of individuals in the criminal justice system.
According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (2022), the current incarcerated population in the United
States is over 90% male with a median age of 36 years old. Further, the current inmate population is
roughly 57% White, 40% Black, and 70% report not identifying as Hispanic/Latinx (Bureau of
Prisons, 2022).
As a future direction, further studies should focus on recruiting not only a larger sample, but
also focus on recruiting a more diverse sample representing all major racial and ethnic backgrounds in
the United States and expanding beyond non-minoritized individuals. In addition to increasing sample
size and expanding to a more diverse sample, future studies should consider limiting the sample to
individuals with direct criminal justice experience (e.g., having been arrested, convicted, and/or spent
time in jail/prison), opposed to the current study that employed individuals with both direct and
indirect (e.g., knowing someone who has been arrested, convicted, and/or been to jail/prison)
experience. Use of participants with direct criminal justice experience can also be used to expand
upon the differences in discounting plea bargain decisions when assigned to a guilty or innocent
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condition, as similar studies have not focused on samples of individuals from this population (e.g.,
Schneider & Zottoli, 2019; Wilford et al., 2021; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Edkins & Dervan, 2013).
Another limitation of this study is the fact that real plea-bargain decisions have a variety of
variables and are more complex than the two-option choice presented in the study. In practice, a
defendant would spend substantially more time deliberating on the decision to accept a plea bargain
or not than participants spent deliberating in this study. Wilford et al (2021) examined some of these
additional variables that go into plea bargain decisions by assigning participants as “guilty” or
“innocent” to determine how that classification effected participants’ willingness to accept a plea
bargain. That study found that “guilty” participants were more likely to accept a plea bargain than
“innocent” participants were (Wilford et al., 2021). This recent study supports other existing research
that brings light to the “innocence problem” often found in the plea-bargaining process wherein study
participants assigned to an “innocent” condition are less likely to accept a plea bargain than
participants assigned “guilty,” but ultimately end up still being more likely to accept a plea bargain
than seeking trial (Edkins & Dervan, 2013). Thus, the current study was limited in that probability
and severity were the only variables related to this complex decision used. As such, future studies
should aim to incorporate some of these variables into their surveys.
Lastly, this study was unable to collect complete data on participants’ geographic location as
more than half of the participants left the question asking for their zip code blank. Ensuring diversity in
location is important as Britt (2000) discussed the importance of considering jurisdictional differences
across counties. As such, it is also of importance for future research to ensure sample participants have
diversity in location, as participant attitudes towards plea bargains can be affected by their locale’s unique
racial and economic disparities. It is noted that there are differences between counties regarding how
harsh judges punish offenders of various racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds dependent on the
county’s existing political climate (Britt, 2000). Thus, this variable should be further explored by
expanding the study sample to individuals from a variety of counties and states. Qualitative measures
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assessing participants’ rationale for accepting or not accepting a plea could also aid in exploring this
variable.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, this study serves as the first to examine plea bargain decision-making with
probability discounting with a sample containing individuals with direct and indirect experience in the
criminal justice sample. Based on model-fit statistics from the Mazur model, this study found evidence
that discounting tasks regarding plea bargain decisions do work. While there are many other variables in
the plea-bargaining decision to be examined, this study’s use of a sample containing individuals with
direct and indirect experience in the criminal justice system provides new perspective to contribute to
the existing body of literature that primarily uses student samples and samples of random adults
(regardless of criminal justice experience). The lack of magnitude effect in this study is ultimately
supported by similar research (Schneider & Zottoli, 2019; Tonry, 2017; O’Connell et al., 2011;
Pogarsky, 2009). With social context, such as the innocence problem, becoming a more widely
researched area of plea-bargain related decisions (Schneider & Zottoli, 2019; Wilford et al., 2021;
Edkins & Dervan, 2013; Dervan & Edkins, 2013), future research should ideally aim to examine effects
of magnitude and varying probabilities of conviction on participants with direct criminal justice
experience assigned to different conditions where they are to assume guilt or innocence. There are still
many unanswered questions in regard to the plea-bargaining process, and with an estimated 12 million
people arrested annually in the United States, the number of individuals affected are too large to ignore.
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